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Abstract 
This paper examines the concept of “new region building” in the Baltic Sea region 
with emphasis on the construction of a collective “Baltic” identity. Possible 
implications of these processes on Russia as a non-EU member state are discussed. 
Region building around the Baltic Sea is conceptualised within the framework of 
social constructivism, and a connection between region building and identity 
formation is established. Furthermore, an attempt is made to shed light on the way 
in which a “Baltic identity” is promoted in the region. By means of a short discourse 
analysis, certain characteristics of the Baltic Sea region are discovered that are 
promoted as the basis for a regional identity by various regional actors. The impact 
of these characteristics on relations between Russia, the EU and the other Baltic Sea 
states are examined and conclusions are drawn in relation to the region building 
processes in the Baltic Sea area.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cooperation in the Baltic Sea region (BSR) has prospered since the independence of 
the Baltic States in the beginning of the 1990s. Several programmes and initiatives 
have been established, such as the Northern Dimension initiative (ND), the Council 
of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) or the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation 
(BSSSC). The EU actively supports cooperation in this region. In 1997, at the 
Luxembourg European Council, Finland’s Northern Dimension initiative (ND) was 
recognized as part of the external EU policies, and in the year 2000, the EU initiated 
the INTERREG III B programme Baltic Sea Region, thereby continuing the 
INTERREG II B programme (1997-2001):  
The European Commission has decided to take an active part in the 
development of the Baltic Sea Region by part-financing the INTERREG III 
B transnational co-operation programme in favour of the following 
countries: Denmark, North-East Germany, Sweden and Finland in the 
European Union and Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia 
and Belarus (INTERREG III B). 
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Some political and economic stakeholders would like to see the BSR developing 
into a “world leading region for innovation” (Serger and Hansson 2004: III), which 
is characterised by economic prosperity and good living standards. Others 
emphasise the region’s potential for providing security and stability in this part of 
Europe by referring to the concept of a “security community” based on the example 
of the Nordic countries (Browning 2001:7; Browning and Joenniemi 2004:240). 
In the following, after a brief clarification of the term “Baltic Sea region”, a 
selection of the literature dealing with “the new region building”1 and identity 
formation in the BSR will be presented and discussed with emphasis on claims 
made concerning the existence and nature of a Baltic identity. This literature review 
will certainly not be exhaustive but it will provide an impression of the opposing 
interpretations and ideas that exist concerning these issues. Subsequently, a number 
of empirical texts serve as the basis for a brief analysis of normative linguistic terms 
in the current political discourse. The analysis will be conducted along the lines of 
Jessen and Pohl, who have analysed six speeches of European leaders concerning 
the issue of Kaliningrad. They thereby examined the construction of a self-other 
divide with regard to Russia (Jessen and Pohl 2003:15).  
DEFINING THE BALTIC SEA REGION 
Although many “Baltic Sea institutions” include other than the littoral states, in this 
paper, the expression “Baltic Sea region” refers to an area composed of the states or 
parts of the states that have a Baltic Sea coastline. This definition is inevitably 
somewhat imprecise and arbitrary, because it is often impossible to determine 
whether a state should be regarded as belonging to this region as a whole or only 
partly. It is generally problematic to draw an external border of the Baltic Sea region 
along the borders of a state or a county or province, because those entities basically 
exist for administrative purposes and often separate collectives of humans that share 
the same historical or cultural backgrounds. Moreover, as will be discussed below, 
it is a contradiction to the concept of a region to define sharp and static borders that 
distinguish it from other areas. Consequently, a clear geographical definition of the 
Baltic Sea region does not and cannot exist. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
paper, a rough outline of the geographical space referred to by the term “Baltic Sea 
region” must be given, but it should be understood that the borders between this 
region and the adjacent areas are blurred and in a constant process of social 
construction.  
                                              
1 The “new region building” refers to the notion that regions are socially constructed by “region-builders”, mainly 
academics and influential politicians from the states that are part of the region. 
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The states lining the Baltic Sea coast are Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Russia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany. As this paper deals with the 
formation of a collective identity of the inhabitants of the Baltic Sea region, this 
region is defined in very narrow terms. It is expected that people identify as 
inhabitants of the Baltic Sea region only if the Baltic Sea plays a role in their daily 
lives. As a consequence, Germany and Russia can obviously not be counted as 
belonging to the Baltic Sea region as a whole. In the case of Germany, the 
“Bundesländer,” Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
are counted as parts of the region; and within the Russian Federation, the 
North-Western Federal District, specifically the area around the cities St. 
Petersburg, Pskov and the Kaliningrad exclave, is regarded as belonging to the 
Baltic Sea region.2 
The distinction between parts that can be defined as belonging to the BSR and those 
that cannot is more difficult in connection with the other, rather smaller states. To be 
precise, with regard to Denmark, only the counties South Jutland, Funen, 
Copenhagen, West Zealand, Roskilde and Storstrøm as well as the island Bornholm 
can be counted as parts of the Baltic Sea region. Concerning Sweden, the counties 
Skåne, Blekinge, Östergötland, Södermanland, Gotland, Stockhom, Uppsala, 
Gävleborg, Västernorrland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten have a Baltic Sea coast 
line. In Finland, this applies to the province Lapland and the sub-state regions 
Northern-Ostrobothnia, Central Ostrobothnia, Ostrobothnia, Satakunta, Finland 
Proper, Uusimaa, Eastern Uusimaa and Kymenlaakso, and in Poland, the 
voivodships West Pomerania, Pomerania and Warmia-Masuria adjoin the Sea. 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are also referred to as the “Baltic States” and account 
for the so-called “Baltic Region” (in contrast to the Baltic Sea region). Therefore, 
those states are not further split into coastal and non-coastal regions but also 
considered to be part of the BSR (more or less) as a whole. 
THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY   
Whereas in IR theory the concept of identity is highly disputed and it is hard to find 
a clear definition (Wæver 2002:20f.), A Dictionary of Geography defines identity as 
the:  
                                              
2 As mentioned above, such a definition according to administrative areas is probably very imprecise and the 
“real” border is possibly somewhere in between. However, the politicians in charge of these administrative entities 
are the ones to decide whether to pursue a policy that engages actively in Baltic Sea cooperation or focuses on 
other aspects. Therefore, to some extent, the populations of such an area are all affected by these policy choices 
and so is the BSR. 
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…characteristics determining the individuality of a being or entity; in the 
constitution of national identities these characteristics may be fostered by 
myths. Human geographers commonly view identity as emerging from 
social action, or the production and reproduction of space (Mayhew in A 
Dictionary of Geography 2004). 
This definition is useful for the examination of collective identity, as it refers to a 
“being or entity” and includes the notion of national identity. Its emphasis on a 
constitution of identity that emerges from social action is in line with the 
propositions of social constructivism. Constructivists hold that reality is socially 
constructed in a process by which ideas, beliefs and perceptions are shared (Jackson 
and Sørensen 2003:254). This happens during interaction, mainly discourse 
practises, e.g. “conversations, narratives, arguments, speeches” (Oxford Dictionary 
of Philosophy 1996) by external as well as internal actors of a group (Wennersten 
1999:276, 278). This distinction between actors inside and outside a certain group 
implies another important prerequisite for the construction of identity: the existence 
of a notion of a “self” and an “other”. William Connolly argues that to create an 
identity there always has to be an “other” to demarcate from (Connolly in Jessen 
and Pohl 2003:11). In other words, the self develops its identity by distancing itself 
from the other. 
The development of a collective identity that stretches across the borders of several 
countries is, according to Wennersten, a rather recent trend that is due to “changing 
dynamics in world affairs [that] ‘are sufficiently powerful to encourage imagining 
supranational, transnational, or subnational communities’” (Rosenau in Wennersten 
1999:276). Wennersten also points out that several collective identities can overlap, 
e.g. a group of people can have different political identities at once (Wennersten 
1999:276). In other words, it can be assumed that people in the Baltic Sea region 
identify with their national states as well as develop a regional identity and maybe 
also identify with the EU at the same time.   
Taking into account the definition cited above, it is possible to speak of a Baltic 
identity if a certain amount of characteristics can be discovered that a majority of 
the people living in this area collectively regard as unique. Consequently, to 
describe the Baltic identity, one has to discover a certain amount of characteristics 
that apply to this region3 and are regarded as important by most of its people.  
                                              
3 Unfortunately, there are no ways of determining how many characteristics are necessary to prove the existence of 
this particular identity and it is also difficult to draw the line between the existence of one or various identities.   
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REGION BUILDING IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION 
A region can be defined as “an area of a country or the world having definable 
characteristics but not always fixed boundaries” (Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary). This definition of a region is similar to the definition of (collective) 
identity. As regions are discursively constructed, as is everything else in the social 
and political world (Jackson and Sørensen 2003), this is perhaps not surprising. The 
notion of “new region building” goes one step further by claiming that 
region-builders deliberately choose the characteristics they want the region to 
possess and make them known to the public, thereby constructing reality by their 
discourse practices4 (Engelen 2004:7ff.). Ole Wæver points out that region building 
in the BSR has become “self-enforcing”: the BSR is perceived to be of importance 
and, consequently, it becomes important (Wæver in Tassinari and Williams 
2003:35). In other words, the perceptions of inside and outside actors contribute to 
the creation of a regional identity.5 In the following, some characteristics will be 
exposed that define the Baltic Sea region and thereby provide a basis for a regional 
identity.  
The concept of a region can be understood in modern as well as in post-modern 
terms. Concerning regions in Europe, two opposite metaphors have been created: 
the “concentric circles Europe” and the “Olympic rings Europe” (Makarychev 
2004:302). The metaphor of concentric circles refers to a modern understanding of 
regions as part of a hierarchy with Brussels at the top, in which the difference 
between the centre and the periphery is considerable. In the metaphor “Olympic 
rings Europe”, all European regions are included, there does not exist a clear centre 
or a periphery, and all regions are equally important. The metaphor “Olympic rings 
Europe” is part of a post-modern understanding of regions (Makarychev 2004:302). 
In the literature, it is often pointed out that the ND – and thereby also the BSR – is a 
good example for a Europe of Olympic rings and a post-modern interpretation of the 
concept of regions (Makarychev 2004; Browning and Joenniemi 2003). Therefore, 
                                              
4 In this context, Browning points out that there is a danger that policy-makers, who promote region building, are 
unconsciously influenced by a Western perspective. Accordingly, “the underlying narratives of the new region 
building (even the ‘post-modern’ ones) also have the propensity to reproduce the very exclusions many hope it 
possible to overcome” (Browning 2001:48). For identity formation, this suggests that the Baltic Sea identity 
reflects the views of those who shaped the region–which are unconsciously based on a conviction of Western 
superiority. Nevertheless, Browning also points out that if people are aware of the “continuing exclusionary nature 
of the discourses underlying the new region building initiatives” (Browning 2001:51), it becomes possible to 
reconceptualise them. 
5 However, it should be kept in mind that the construction of a region around the Baltic Sea was inspired by a 
post-modern theoretical approach. Neumann points out that this region building was conducted by “a tightly knit 
epistemic community of ‘Nordic’ foreign political intellectuals” (Neumann in Browning 2001: 3). In contrast, a 
“region” can also be seen from a more modernist point of view, as it is the case in Russia. The regions in Russia 
have been introduced for administrative purposes and probably have no unifying characteristics that would 
enhance the development of regional identities (Browning and Joenniemi 2003a: 84). 
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one of the characteristics of the BSR is its conceptualisation as a “post-modern 
region” with a focus on dialogue instead of negotiation, inclusiveness and a 
potential to overcome frontiers rather than to create new ones (Browning and 
Joenniemi 2003b:467), and a multitude of networks. These characteristics evolved 
from the policy of the ND. The construction of the EU’s Northern Dimension 
thereby contributed to the current understanding of the BSR. 
Apart from that, some other factors are claimed to be of importance in the BSR. Of 
those, the factor “security” is assumed to have been one of the most important 
driving forces for region building. In the literature, there are diverging positions 
concerning the impact that this factor has had on the BSR. For instance, Browning 
and Joenniemi claim that regional cooperation in the BSR can only function if 
motivated by security (Browning and Joenniemi 2004:245). Adopting a slightly 
different point of view, Morozov argues that desecuritisation in particular is a 
prerequisite for post-modern region building. Desecuritisation is defined here as 
“the process whereby interaction becomes centred on issues other than security, 
while security as such is actually enhanced by avoiding the language of security” 
(Morozov 2004:318).  
Moreover, Tassinari and Williams differentiate between the concepts “hard” and 
“soft security”6 and their implications on region building. They state that “hard”, 
military, security issues are dealt with “from above” by actors such as the EU or 
NATO, whereas soft security matters are addressed by regional actors “from below” 
(Tassinari and Williams 2003:38). For the origin of the BSR, this means that hard 
security concerns have been a motivation for engaging in cross-border cooperation 
for the former Soviet States in order to escape the Russian sphere of influence 
(Browning and Joenniemi 2004:237). However, at the same time, region building in 
the BSR is estimated to have been started “from below with numerous actors in the 
beginning striving for completely different goals” (Tassinari and Williams 
2003:35). Tassinari and Williams thus claim that there are two dimensions of region 
building, one from below and one from above that are complementary and can 
operate simultaneously.  
Those three different approaches towards the origins of a post-modern BSR have 
different implications for its future. Browning and Joenniemi (2004) claim that 
cooperation after EU and NATO enlargement will come to an end unless other 
motivations for cooperation than just security are found. Morozov’s approach to 
desecuritisation, in contrast, suggests that cooperation is becoming motivated by 
other issues than security and will thus continue.  
                                              
6 According to Pynnöniemi and Raik, “soft security” refers to non-military issues and common threats that call for 
cooperative responses (Pynnöniemi and Raik 2003). 
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Tassinari and Williams’ focus on a complementary process of region building from 
above and below implies that soft security issues will lead to continued cooperation 
even after the hard security issues, addressed previously from above, lose their 
immediacy. This explanation of the construction of the BSR as an interplay of 
forces from above and below is also compatible with the claim that the BSR was 
constituted on the basis of the vision represented by the ND. Although the 
policy-makers who created the ND were not concerned with hard security, they 
engaged in the existing processes of cooperation that had developed from below, 
and imprinted an overall concept and a vision from above. 
With respect to the definition provided above, the purpose of this overview was to 
describe the BSR as an area of the world with some special characteristics. Those 
include that it is a post-modern region, symbolising the metaphor of “Olympic rings 
Europe,” that it has no centre, is inclusive and consists of overlapping networks. 
Concerning the origin of the BSR, many academics regard security threats that had 
to be overcome collectively as the starting point for regional cooperation. Further 
characteristics of the BSR can be found, such as geography, since the Baltic Sea 
region is of course to a great extent defined by the Baltic Sea or its location in 
Northern Europe. A thorough exploration of all characteristics of the BSR is, 
however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
To sum it up, the presentation of the concepts “identity” and “region” has 
demonstrated that in the BSR, the processes of identity formation and region 
building appear to be closely interwoven and to happen in parallel. Policy-makers, 
who try to construct a region, inevitably also construct specific characteristics that 
define this region. If the majority of the inhabitants of this region then agree that 
these characteristics define the Baltic Sea region and, if they consider themselves 
part of this region, they develop a regional identity – which in turn has influence on 
their social reality, and thereby the existence and nature of the region. In Catellani’s 
words: “There seems in fact to be a close link between the political objective to 
establish cooperative ties across the Baltic and the need of creating a sense or a form 
of common belonging to a single community” (Catellani 2003:18). 
DIVERGING APPROACHES TOWARDS A BALTIC IDENTITY IN THE 
LITERATURE 
Some academics claim that for several reasons a common BSR identity has failed to 
emerge. Firstly, they state that cooperation has only been established to address 
security risks and to help the Baltic countries and Poland to become democratic 
market economies and therefore, the cooperation will cease to exist after these 
problems are solved (Browning and Joenniemi 2004:243, 245). Secondly, it is 
claimed that tensions between the EU and Russia prevent a common identity from 
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being established (Browning 2001:52). Thirdly, it has been stated that any identity 
that is imposed on the region cannot function – only an identity that has developed 
slowly over the centuries from below such as the Scandinavian “asecurity 
community” (Browning and Joenniemi 2004) can be sustainable. 
Other academics have noted that the countries around the Baltic Sea prefer to 
highlight – and thereby to identify with – diverging characteristics of the region. It is 
claimed that academics and politicians particularly from Germany, the 
Scandinavian countries and the EU tend to emphasise a common Baltic history and 
actively support the notion of a Baltic identity (Catellani 2003:18; Browning 
2001:5f., 51; Tassinari 2003:10; Jessen and Pohl 2003:11, 13f.). In contrast, in the 
Baltic States and Poland, people are more likely to stress the “Europeanness” of the 
Baltic Sea region that is used in this context as a synonym for being closer to the EU 
and the West (Browning and Joenniemi 2003b:471). Concerning opinions from 
Russian politicians and academics, there can hardy be found any emphasis on 
common traits applying to all littoral states in the literature. The perception of 
Russia as a modern, Westphalian state, which prevails in the current political elite, 
makes it difficult for policy-makers to appreciate the merits of cross-border 
cooperation, networking and political activity on regional levels.  
As to the common images from a shared history that are especially promoted by 
people from Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the EU, it is argued that the 
most well known images are the “new Hanse,”7 Pomor,8 the Viking Age and the 
North. Of those, according to Catellani (2003), the images of the “Hanse” or Pomor 
are stronger than a “Northern” identity – represented by the ND – or an “EU 
identity”. For the Hanse, this claim seems to be confirmed by the fact that this 
trading network is still well known to many inhabitants of the coastal areas along 
the Baltic Sea, because the Hanse once consisted of or ruled over towns like 
Lübeck, Hamburg, Rostock and Stralsund in Germany; Szczecin, Gdansk and 
Elblag in Poland; Kaliningrad (then the German Königsberg), Novgorod and Pskov, 
which today belong to Russia; Tallinn in Estonia; Riga in Latvia; Stockholm, 
Kalmar and Visby in Sweden; and Turku in Finland.  
                                              
7 The words “Hanse” or “Hansa” refer to the Hanseatic League which was “an alliance of trading cities that for a 
time in the later Middle Ages and the Early Modern period maintained a trade monopoly over most of Northern 
Europe and the Baltic” (Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia “Hanse” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanse> 
[accessed 23.02. 2005]). 
8 “Pomors” (поморы) are settlers of the White Sea coasts. Explorers from Novgorod entered the White Sea 
through Northern Dvina estuary and founded the Russian settlements along its coast. They reached as far as 
trans-Ural areas of Northern Siberia and founded the city of Mangazeya. They maintained a Northern trade route 
between Arkhangelsk and Siberia” (Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia “Pomors” 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pomor> [accessed 22.02. 2005].) 
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However, in spite of this high profile in the region, the image of the “new Hanse” 
has been discovered to evoke rather negative connotations among a number of 
inhabitants of the region, as it is associated with German imperialism. Thus, the 
Hanse does not present the good example of peaceful cross-border cooperation that 
it was intended to be, among others by Björn Engholm in the beginning of the 1990s 
(Engelen 2004:14).Nevertheless, as Jörg Hackman puts it:  
…one might argue that the Hanseatic League is the most appropriate 
conception to use in constructing such as Baltic identity. […] It could be 
argued that the temporary success of the New Hansa as concept was due 
to its vagueness and presumably also to the fact that it does not really 
interfere with contested historical topics amongst the societies on the 
Baltic rim. In other words, the Hansa can easily be associated with 
positive developments such as trade, exchange, wealth and inter-cultural 
contacts. If there was occasionally a slight reluctance towards Engholm’s 
image of the Hansa, this was based not so much on different political 
conceptions as on a national perspective which held that it was blurring 
the colonial role of the Hansa in the past (Hackman 2003:79). 
In other words, the image of the new Hansa does seem to have its advantages, as 
Catalani stated, but it also evokes negative connotations and must therefore be 
treated carefully.  
The metaphors of the Hanse and Pomor fit to the post-modern nature of the region: 
they refer to former loose, open and inclusive trade networks. Those characteristics 
are reflected in institutions such as the CBSS or the UBC. In addition, there are 
institutions in the region that deliberately try to discover and maintain the common 
culture and past and thereby actively contribute to the development of a common 
identity. Such an institution is the Baltic Sea Heritage Co-operation.9 The existence 
of the Baltic Sea Heritage Co-operation shows that some policy-makers have 
already taken active measures in promoting a common identity based on a common 
history and a common cultural heritage; thus, the attempt to create an identity 
definitely exists within the region. 
To sum it up, this review has illustrated the debate about the existence, duration and 
nature of a BSR identity. While there are many arguments supporting each 
approach, what can be stated here is that at least the endeavour to construct a 
common Baltic identity definitely does exist. Institutions such as the Baltic Sea 
Heritage Co-operation promote an identity in the region that is based on a common 
                                              
9 The institution held a Cultural Heritage Forum on “Baltic Sea Identity” in Gdansk in April 2003 (Baltic Sea 
Heritage Co-operation, Homepage <http://balticheritage.raa.se/> [accessed 23.02.2005]).   
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history and a common culture. In the next part of this paper, the previous statements 
regarding a Baltic identity will be complemented by an empirical study. This is 
expected to show to what extent a common Baltic history is of importance for the 
construction of a Baltic identity, which aspects from history are promoted if any, 
and whether there are other characteristics that serve to define “Balticness”.  
LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES 
In this part, five empirical texts will be examined with a focus on possible 
characteristics of the BSR that are promulgated in spoken language. The examples 
comprise, firstly, a speech by the former Commissioner for External Affairs of the 
EU at the eleventh ministerial meeting of the CBSS in Svetlogorsk on the sixth of 
October 2002; secondly, a speech by the Vice Governor of St. Petersburg and 
Chairman of the Committee for External Relations held at the 11th Anniversary 
Conference on Subregional Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region on the 24th of 
October 2003; thirdly, a speech by the President of Lithuania, held at the seventh 
October 2004 at a business lunch hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Vilnius; fourthly, a speech by the Swedish Chairman of the Standing Committee of 
the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC), held on the 23rd of November 
2004 in Brussels and finally, an interview of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the German Newspaper Handelsblatt in Moscow from the 28th of December 
2004. 10  These five examples represent five different institutions: the EU 
Commission, the local government of St. Petersburg, Lithuania’s government, the 
BSPC and Russia’s government.11  
The empirical examples were chosen according to the following criteria: they 
should reflect spoken language, they should be rather new, they should all concern 
the BSR, and they should express the views of inhabitants from different BSR 
countries or members of BSR institutions. Russia is assigned a special role because 
the purpose of this paper is to examine whether an emerging Baltic identity can 
serve to bridge the gap between the Russian BSR inhabitants, as the only non-EU 
citizens, and the people from the other states of the region.  
                                              
10 As Jessen and Pohl put it, speeches today are written not by the speakers themselves but by speechwriters 
(Jessen and Pohl in Hansson 2003: 15). Consequently, they do not reflect the speakers’ opinion but the views of 
the institution that the speaker represents. The same is probably also true for the interviews with politicians. For 
instance, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs mentions himself that it is the President of the Russian 
Federation who decides on the country’s foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
2005: 9).   
11 It would be interesting to examine not only the position of the Lithuania and Russian governments but also the 
other seven countries of the region. Likewise, it would be of interest to examine more institutions than the BSPC, 
the BSSSC and the Commission as well as the positions of other BSR inhabitants. However, a much larger amount 
of empirical research would be necessary to draw a more coherent picture of the current situation in the BSR.  
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It should further be noted that it is not a requirement that the examples of spoken 
language should be made exclusively by people from the region, because the 
perception of outsiders is also of importance for the construction of a collective 
identity. In fact, as a detailed description of each speaker’s background is not a part 
of this paper, it cannot be known for sure whether any of them regards themselves as 
inhabitants of the Baltic Sea region as defined above. It is only possible to 
distinguish whether the institutions represented by the speakers belong to the 
region. Therefore, the speech by the Governor of St. Petersburg is analysed as the 
view of a Russian politician from within the region while the interview with the 
Russian foreign minister can be seen as the perception of an “outsider” who, due to 
his political position, conveys the perception of the Russian government. The 
speech by the Commissioner for External Affairs of the EU is regarded here as an 
outsider’s viewpoint because the Commission is not a Baltic Sea regional institution 
even though it participates actively in Baltic Sea cooperation. The speech by the 
President of Lithuania can be regarded as an insider’s view if one defines the whole 
of Lithuania as belonging to the BSR – this problem could in principle only be 
solved by asking the Lithuanians whether they feel like inhabitants of the BSR. 
Finally, the speech by the Swedish Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) is considered an insider’s view as the 
BSPC is definitely a Baltic Sea regional institution. As to the positions conveyed in 
the speeches, none of the speeches are understood to reflect the perception of 
Russia, Lithuania, Sweden or the EU as a whole, but as the speeches were held by 
leading politicians, they probably reflect the official positions of the governments or 
institutions they represent. 
It is furthermore considered important that those examples present spoken 
language, because such a form of discourse has to take the setting into account, e.g. 
the words of the speaker have a direct impact on an audience. Additionally, spoken 
language tends to be less factual but more focussed on the mediation of a message or 
vision. Thus, the analysis of speeches or interviews can be expected to shed light on 
the question of how identity is constructed in the BSR. 
The speeches have been evaluated with regard to the use of personal and possessive 
pronouns because through them a divide between the self and the other is 
constructed. Additionally, focus has been on the way in which the terms Europe, 
EU, West, Russia and the BSR are used. Furthermore, attention has been paid to the 
construction of a possible vision for the region, and conclusions concerning an 
identity of the BSR have been drawn.  
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ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY COMMISSIONER CHRIS PATTEN (TEXT 1) 
In his speech at the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Commissioner Chris Patten 
uses mostly the pronouns “we” and “our” when referring to the Commission, e.g. 
“We need to explore common ground between Russia’s wish to ensure easy transit 
between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia, and our own need to ensure our 
security” (Patten 2002:2). By “ensure our security” the EU-members are included 
into the self, whereas Russia and especially Kaliningrad are linguistically excluded. 
The “other” as opposite of the “self” is constructed in the phrases “our policy on 
Kaliningrad” (Ibid.:1), “Kaliningrad has lagged behind the rest of the Baltic and 
many other regions of Russia” (Ibid.) and “discussion with Russia and the candidate 
countries bordering on Kaliningrad” (Ibid.:1f.). Concerning the use of “Europe,” it 
is interesting that the Commissioner mentions “Europe’s Northern Dimension” 
(Ibid.:1) suggesting that the ND, which is normally referred to as the “EU’s 
Northern Dimension,” goes beyond the EU. Consequently, in this case he 
distinguishes between the notion of “Europe” and the “EU” and includes Russia 
into Europe.  
With regard to the use of the term “EU,” which represents the “self” in this speech, 
the following sentence expresses the role that is attributed to the EU for cooperation 
in the BSR: “The importance of the Northern Dimension can only grow as the 
context of the region changes, and as four more Baltic countries become members 
of the EU” (Ibid.). The ND is also referred to as “a broad concept that touches many 
aspects of EU policy in this region” (Ibid.). 
Russia is mentioned in Patten’s speech in connection with “the spread of organised 
crime, illegal immigration, environmental pollution and diseases like AIDS [which] 
challenge the security of Kaliningrad and Russia as well as that of present and future 
EU Member States”. This image reveals that, from the Commission’s viewpoint, 
Russia is associated with soft security threats. Similarly, tensions between the EU 
and Russia underlie the phrases “discussion with Russia” instead of dialogue 
(Ibid.:2) and “Let us move on from sterile argument about things like the format of 
meetings and start real co-operation on substance” (Ibid., italics added) indicating 
that cooperation between the EU and Russia does not yet function as anticipated. 
However, at the same time, the relations are depicted in positive terms as well, 
evident in the phrases “our Russian friends” (Ibid.) or “our friends in Moscow” 
(Ibid.). 
The BSR is generally mentioned positively in the speech as illustrated with the 
following: “For me there are three key-words for Baltic regional cooperation in the 
coming decade: focus, leadership, and opportunity” (Ibid.). Chris Patten formulates 
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a vision not for the BSR but for the ND: “Europe's Northern Dimension stands on 
the threshold of tremendous new opportunities for continuing democratic 
development, for enhanced regional cooperation, and for shared prosperity” (Ibid.).  
Summarising, the speech shows that although the Commission is an official 
member of the CBSS, the BSR is viewed from outside. This speech does not serve 
the establishment of a Baltic identity but the reinforcement of the EU identity. 
When speaking of the region, the Commissioner underlines the importance of the 
Northern Dimension, which is an EU policy. Russia is treated as an outsider due to 
underlying tensions between the EU and Russia concerning Kaliningrad. The 
message of this speech is that cooperation in an EU frame should be the uniting 
element in the BSR. 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY THE VICE GOVERNOR OF ST. PETERSBURG 
(TEXT 2) 
The “self” that is constructed in the speech by the Vice Governor A.V. Prokhorenko 
of St. Petersburg at a BSSSC Meeting, is the city or the local government of St. 
Petersburg. Occasionally, the Baltic countries are included into the self, which is 
evident in the phrases, “our common history” (Prokhorenko 2003:3), “our common 
past and present, our cultures and our children” (Ibid.:4), and “our organization” 
(Ibid.:5) referring to the BSSSC. 
The “other” is only constructed indirectly: the sentence “we would love to see 
considerable progress in removing visa barriers” (Ibid.) can also be understood as 
criticism towards the EU, which has not yet removed those barriers. So indirectly, 
the EU presents the “other”. 
St. Petersburg is, in this speech, regarded as part of “Europe.” The Southwestern 
Waste Water Treatment Complex in St. Petersburg is described as “the largest 
facility of its kind in Europe” (Ibid.:4). The EU’s role in the BSR is indirectly 
mentioned, as the Northern Dimension programme is said to be progressing. 
Symbols of St. Petersburg’s ties to the West are clearly the presents that are given to 
the city by the other BSR countries. Many of them refer to a common Western 
culture including literature, architecture, music, film, art and history (Ibid.:3f.). 
Those symbols are not discursively constructed in the speech, but described as facts. 
They also reveal that the Baltic Sea countries regard St. Petersburg as one of them, 
not as part of an “other”.  
The BSR plays an important role in this speech, which is shown in the sentence, 
“[s]ustainable peaceful development in our region is conditional on our joint effort 
on addressing our common challenges, building on our common success and shared 
IJIS Volume 3
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (2005) 
 
 
58 
advantages both geographic and geopolitical” (Ibid.:5). The BSR is represented as 
inclusive, e.g. “all Baltic Sea nations without exception” (Ibid.:3), and a notion of 
commonness is constructed by referring to history: “our millennium-old common 
history” (Ibid.). The vision of the speech is a continued, sustainable, peaceful 
development based on a common past and present that will lead to a shared future 
(Ibid.:4). 
This speech strongly reflects the effort to construct a common Baltic identity on the 
basis of a common history. The basis for the commonness of all the Baltic countries 
that is taken from history is not, as suggested in the literature, the Hanse or Pomor 
but the Viking Age. The Vice Governor refers to the time of Rurik (Ibid.:3), a 
“semi-legendary leader of the Varangians (Vikings)” 12 that came from Sweden to 
Russia.  
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF LITHUANIA (TEXT 3) 
The “self” in the speech by the President of Lithuania, Mr. Adamkus, speaking to 
the American Chamber of Commerce, includes Lithuania, the Baltic States 
(Adamkus 2004:2) and sometimes the whole BSR (Ibid.:2,3). Russia, not being a 
member of the EU, is regarded as the “other.” It is claimed that Russia should be 
involved “more actively into European affairs” (Ibid.:2). Here “European” does not 
include Russia but means “the EU” or “Western”. At the same time, “the European 
policy” of Baltic governments is regarded as important for the success of the region 
(Ibid.). Consequently, this implies that Russia, as the “other,” needs to adapt to 
“European” values to be included into the Baltic “self” and make the BSR a success: 
“with Russia participating, we can make the Baltic sea region one of the most 
prosperous areas in Europe” (Ibid.). 
The BSR is mentioned positively in the speech: “The current situation in the region, 
which includes affluent Nordic countries, small and dynamic Baltic States, Poland, 
parts of Germany and Northwestern Russia, is well balanced” (Ibid.:1). Most of the 
time, the economic developments are highlighted: “The symbiosis of affluent and 
technologically advanced Nordic states and Germany on the one hand and the 
dynamism of the Baltic States on the other make the Baltic region one of the fastest 
growing regions in the European Union” (Ibid.).  
The vision presented in this speech also refers to economic success, illustrated in the 
sentences, “Therefore, our actions in the long run should aim at reinforcing the 
positive trend that brings welfare to the region via taxes, knowledge and expertise” 
                                              
12 World Encyclopedia. Philip's (2004) “rurik”, < http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview 
=Main&entry=t142.e10078> [accessed 20.02. 2005]. 
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(Ibid); and “Innovation and competitiveness are the two main priorities for the 
Baltic region. These two pillars are crucial in making our region an outstanding 
place to do business” (Ibid.:3). 
Summarising, in this speech the BSR is associated with welfare and economic 
progress. This is probably partly due to the fact that the speech was held at a 
business lunch that was hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce. 
Consequently, in order to impress the American partners, the economic success of 
the region had to be emphasised. As the audience does not comprise members of the 
BSR, the speech has not so much the purpose to construct a feeling of commonness 
but to present the BSR in the most positive way. Evidence of a BSR identity can 
nevertheless be discovered in the frequent reference to this success and to an 
Europeanness that should also include Russia. 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BSPC STANDING 
COMMITTEE (TEXT 4)  
In the speech by Mr Olsson, the Swedish Chairman of the Standing Committee of 
the BSPC, the “self” includes the BSPC as well as the people of the region, which 
becomes clear in the sentences, “we can look at the development of the Baltic Sea 
Region as a success story. The region is rich, we have high standards of living, 
people have good education and there is functioning infrastructure in the region” 
(Olsson:1f.). 
The “other” is not strongly presented in this speech, but in the sentence, “we see the 
importance of developing as close relations as possible between the EU and Russia 
as paramount” (Ibid.:3), the EU and Russia are constructed as the “other” in contrast 
to the BSPC. This sentence also shows that the EU is presented as important for the 
region. It is even indicated that the BSPC hoped that the BSR would increase in 
importance after the enlargement which, however, has not yet happened (Ibid.).  
Similarly to the Lithuanian President, the Swedish Chairman also constructs an 
image of the BSR as a prosperous, economically successful region (Ibid.:1). It refers 
briefly to a uniting history, e.g. “rich common cultural heritage and history” 
(Ibid.:2). Additionally, the importance of the BSR in national parliaments is 
underlined: “One of the most significant outcomes of the cooperation, as I see it, is 
the Baltic Sea perspective and Baltic Sea cooperation has become a natural part of 
the everyday work in our national parliaments” (Ibid.:4). The vision evident in this 
speech is that the BSPC should promote the “democratic, economic, social and 
cultural development in the region” (Ibid.). 
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To sum it up, evidence of the promotion of a common Baltic Sea identity can be 
found in the reference to a common culture and history in this speech. Being a BSR 
institution, the BSPR apparently takes part in the construction of such an identity 
because a more coherent and integrated region will improve its functioning and 
importance. For similar reasons, people of the Baltic Sea that are united by a 
common history are advised to regard themselves as inhabitants of a prosperous, 
successful region that is on the way to gaining more importance within the 
framework of the EU. It is expected that the Russian parts of the region can easily 
adapt to these aims. 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (TEXT 5) 
In the interview with the German newspaper “Handelsblatt,” the Russian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs refers to the Russian government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation:1) or the Russian Federation (Ibid.:2) when he uses the 
pronoun “we.” The “self” is also constructed in the way that Russia is described as 
“one of the leading military and economic powers” (Ibid.:4) and when it is claimed 
that the Russians live in a “real world of real politics” (Ibid). The “other” in the 
interview are clearly the Baltic states Latvia and Estonia, who do not observe 
minority rights and allow Russian minorities to be discriminated against, (Ibid.:3). 
In addition, Europe is part of the “other,” evident in the phrase “we asked the 
Europeans” (Ibid.:4), as is the EU, which in the context of minority rights’ issues 
“ignored these problems” (Ibid.:3).  
The notion of Europe that is constructed by Mr. Lavrov’s words is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, Europe is regarded as not including Russia. For example, the Foreign 
Minister speaks of exports “to Europe from Russia” (Ibid.:4). On the other hand, he 
explicitly states, “And then Russia too, in all the parameters, is of course a European 
country” (Ibid.:5). This reflects clearly that the discussion of Russia’s European 
identity still is not solved internally. The EU is often associated with Europe and the 
West (Ibid.:2). It is represented by the EU Commission, which violates obligations 
to Russia (Ibid.:4). Nevertheless, the necessity of a functioning partnership is 
highlighted: “Geography, economy, history, culture – all this conditions the 
necessity of our partnership with the European Union” (Ibid.:5). The Foreign 
Minister states that EU membership of Russia is not even considered theoretically 
(Ibid.:6) due to the complicated accession of the 10 new members (Ibid.).  
The notion of the West is represented by Europe and NATO (Ibid.:2). Lavrov 
admits, “we are partners with NATO, but we see no point in the NATO 
enlargement” (Ibid.:7) and also mentions concerns on the Russian side: “For 
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practically on the day of the declaration of the enlargement AWACS aircraft 
immediately began to fly along the Russian borders, and combat aircraft were 
deployed in Lithuania” (Ibid.). Consequently, Russia’s relations to the West appear 
rather complicated and fragile but are nonetheless viewed as important by both 
partners. 
The BSR is not mentioned at all when the Foreign Minister enumerates the 
countries, regions and states that are of interest for Russian foreign policy 
(Ibid.:4f.). However, the region is referred to in connection with hard security: “this 
region from the point of view of security presents no threats at present” (Ibid.:7). 
A vision for the future can be found in the following sentence: “we want to 
safeguard our interests not through confrontation, but through a dialogue 
partner-like, constructive and pragmatic” (Ibid.:4). This reveals that although the 
Foreign Minister stresses the words “dialogue” and “partner,” he nevertheless also 
refers to the Russian self-interest, which is characteristic for a realist worldview. 
Concluding, it can be said that for the Russian government the BSR only plays a 
role in the context of hard security issues. These findings confirm the view 
presented in the literature that the BSR is marginalized in Russian politics and that 
(military) security is still very important in the discourse of the current political 
elite. Nevertheless, this interview also includes the statement that the EU and Russia 
are united by their common history, as they are both “European”. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE LITERATURE AND THE LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 
The results from the empirical analysis confirm some of the statements presented in 
the literature review. For example, in the literature it has been suggested that in the 
Baltic States the aspects “being European” and “independent from Russia” play a 
strong role. The President of Lithuania13  indirectly supports this notion in his 
speech by presenting a “European policy” as the key to success for the governments 
of the BSR. He also emphasises that Russia should become a part of Europe, which 
illustrates that the Lithuanian government would appreciate it if Russia was 
included into Europe and operated under the umbrella of the EU. 
In addition, the interview with the Russian Foreign Minister seems to confirm the 
statement that security is still important for the Russian government’s perception of 
the BSR. Conversely, in the speech by the Vice Governor of St. Petersburg, security 
                                              
13 Representing the position of the government, not all Lithuanians! 
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has not played a role at all.14 This shows once more that, first of all, there can be 
several approaches towards the nature of the BSR if one examines several examples 
of discourse within one country. Obviously, there does not exist only one discourse 
in Russia, nor does there exist only one identity of the people in the BSR. For 
generalisation purposes, it can be stated that there seems to be differences between 
the position of the local government of St. Petersburg and the Russian government 
towards the BSR. Secondly, these differences can also be seen as representing the 
internal split between “pro-European” and “pro-Eurasian” Russians, which is an 
important aspect of the construction of identity in Russia and thus should be taken 
into account with regard to a collective identity in the BSR. 
Furthermore, the EU Commission’s perception of the BSR presented in the 
literature has also been verified in the study. The speech by Chris Patten suggests 
that although the Commission approves of the region’s success, it attributes this 
success exclusively to the ND, which is an EU policy. The Commissioner’s attitude 
towards Russia expresses indirectly a notion of Western superiority. Consequently, 
in line with the arguments found in the literature, the Commission seems to support 
a “Northern Dimension identity” in the BSR that is close to an “EU identity” and 
that is based on a demarcation from “Russian problems” such as organised crime. 
Finally, as also mentioned in the literature review, the image of the Viking Age is 
used in the BSR as a basis for a common identity. The Vice Governor of St. 
Petersburg underlines this in his speech. To a lesser extent, he also highlights “the 
North” as a basis for an identity, though not associating this with the BSR but with 
an Arctic region. The fact that he does not mention the Hanseatic League as a basis 
for a common identity can easily be explained. Unlike Novgorod, Pskov or Tver, St. 
Petersburg has not had any connections to this trade alliance.15 However, in order to 
determine whether the Viking Age plays an important role as a basis for a Baltic 
identity in general, more research is necessary.  
Some additional findings have been made in the examination. Firstly, economic 
success and prosperity is emphasised in the texts 2, 3 and 4 and can therefore be 
assumed to play an important role for the way in which the policy-makers of the 
BSR view the region. Secondly, Europeanness is mentioned in the texts 1, 2, 3 and 
5. This notion is therefore not only important for the government of Lithuania but 
                                              
14 Of course, this may be due to the circumstances under which the speech was held. In order to find out whether 
security only plays a role in connection with the BSR from Russian outsiders’ points of view, it is necessary to 
analyse a much larger amount of empirical data, which was beyond the scope of this paper. 
15 “Hanseatic league” in Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia (Online database). Available from 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanseatic_League#Members_of_the_Hanseatic_League> [accessed 22.02. 2005]. 
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also for the policy-makers in St. Petersburg and in the Commission. Thirdly, a 
common Baltic history is mentioned in texts 2 and 4.  
As a result, the examples suggest that an emphasis on Europeanness is likely to be 
found in the discourse16 concerning the BSR – it is mentioned by outsiders, such as 
the Commissioner, as well as insiders of the region, such as the Vice Governor of St. 
Petersburg and the President of Lithuania. However, the fact that Europeanness also 
plays a role in the interview with the Russian Foreign Minister is of little importance 
here, as this is not explicitly associated with the BSR and therefore it provides 
insights in the process of constructing a collective Russian identity rather than a 
Baltic identity. Moreover, a common history seems to play a role as a basis for 
identification, which is shown among other things in the gifts to the 300th 
anniversary of St. Petersburg. A factor that seems to unite only the inhabitants of 
EU member states in the BSR seems to be the economic success of the region. Only 
the representative of the Russian government mentions security in connection with 
the BSR and only the Commissioner emphasises the ND as important for the BSR; 
therefore, they are not considered further as bases for a BSR identity. 
Consequently, the literature review and the empirical study of the discourse 
examples of certain politicians have shown that a common history and a common 
culture, expressed in metaphors such as the Viking Age, could be an important 
characteristic of the BSR. A common past and culture is also emphasised by some 
of the institutions of the BSR. In addition, Europeanness is used as a basis for a 
Baltic identity and supported not only by people from the Baltic States and Poland17 
but also by representatives from St. Petersburg in Russia and the EU. Another 
aspect has been noticeable in the empirical study is the region’s economic success. 
A vision of prosperity and high living standards throughout the region – similar to 
the vision presented in the introduction – therefore seems to provide a third 
important characteristic of the BSR and a basis for a Baltic identity. 
The findings of the preceding chapters lead to the central question of this paper: 
What influence can a BSR identity have on the self-other divide between “Western 
Europe” and “outsiders” such as Russia? In the literature as well as the empirical 
study, tensions between the EU and Russia have been apparent. The self-other 
                                              
16 “The discourse” does not indicate that there is only one discourse in one region, state etc. but refers to the sum of 
spoken and written language in a certain area. In this context, analysing the discourse of the Baltic Sea region 
refers to a thorough examination of some examples of spoken or written language, as it is impossible to examine 
the whole discourse. By referring to the discourse of the Baltic Sea region, the results of the analysis of certain 
examples are meant, and it is clear that a more broad or differently conducted analysis would possibly come to 
other results about the regional discourse – which does not mean that either of the results are wrong but that the 
discourse can include many aspects and also change over time. 
17 Cf. the section on “Diverging Approaches towards a Baltic Identity in the Literature” above. 
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divide between the EU and Russia, Europe and Russia, or the West and Russia has 
been perceptible in all five empirical texts. The different characteristics of the 
region have diverse implications for this divide.  
Firstly, an identity based on a common past and culture seems to include and unite 
all BSR countries. However, one has to be aware that the policy-makers 
constructing the region and its identity are today mostly EU-citizens. Their visions 
of the BSR are chosen on the basis of Western values. This applies to the Hanse, 
which started as an alliance of German traders that began to explore and dominate 
the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, although it has been said that the image of the 
Hanse corresponds to the post-modern nature of the BSR, it might not be as 
inclusive as it seems. Moreover, the Viking Age, which was presented as an 
example of a uniting history by the Vice Governor of St. Petersburg, must be treated 
carefully too. Precisely the legend of Rurik, the founder of the first “Rus” empire, 
has led to disputes among historians. The interpretation of the legend that is mostly 
supported by Western scholars suggests that the ancestors of today’s Russia came 
from Scandinavia. Another way of interpreting the legend, which is put forward 
mostly by historians from Eastern Europe, holds that the ancestors of Russians were 
Slavs. Although the Vice Governor even underlines the Swedish origin of Rurik and 
does not seem to regard Scandinavian ancestors as problematic, it cannot be 
expected that all Russians are of the same opinion. Consequently, by referring to a 
common Baltic history as a basis for identity and taking as an example the Vikings, 
one could implicitly reinforce claims of Western superiority and Eastern or Slav 
inferiority by taking sides with the Western interpretation of the legend of Russia’s 
origin.18  
Secondly, Europeanness has been highlighted as a basis for a BSR identity. For 
Russian BSR inhabitants, like the Vice Governor of St. Petersburg, this notion does 
not seem to pose problems because he makes it clear that he considers St. Petersburg 
a part of Europe – but the Russian government might see things in a different light. 
Europeanness has several connotations. For the politicians from the Baltic States 
and Poland and to some extent Northwest Russia, an identity based on 
Europeanness seems to underline Western values and strengthen their ties to the 
EU. For some Russians, Europeanness is interpreted in geographical terms but not 
so much in cultural terms, but other Russians associate Europeanness with Western 
notions of superiority. From the interview with the Russian Foreign Minister, it was 
                                              
18  Cf. “Rurik: disputed origin” in Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia (Online database), 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rurik#Disputed_origin> [accessed 24.08. 2005]; “Rus’ (People)” in The Free 
Dictionary By Farlex (Online database), <http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Rus%27+%28people%29> 
[accessed 24.08 2005]. 
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evident that the Russian government sometimes depicts being European as 
something positive and sometimes as negative. 
Thirdly, economic success and welfare appear to be a rather strong basis for a BSR 
identity. Yet, an identity based on this vision can hardly be sustainable if the BSR 
fails to develop into one of Europe’s most prosperous regions and this vision is 
proven wrong. What is more, this basis for an identity mostly applies to the EU 
member states of the BSR and leaves out Russia. The economic prospects for the 
near future are less promising for the Russian regions than for the other BSR 
countries. Consequently, an identity based on this aspect is also likely to widen the 
gap between Russia and “the West”. 
It can be argued that none of these aspects alone can provide the people of the region 
with a basis for developing a Baltic identity. But many people living in the BSR 
could possibly agree to have several aspects in common. A certain amount of 
historical connections, the notion of belonging to Europe, and the awareness of 
being an inhabitant of a region with a large economic potential – in addition to 
living close to the Baltic Sea with its unique characteristics – may be characteristics 
that in the long-term perspective could become aspects of a common Baltic identity.  
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper has been to discuss the connection of “new region building” in 
the Baltic Sea region to the construction of a collective identity with respect to the 
implications on Russia as a non-EU member state  
The starting point of the essay was a presentation of the connection between 
processes of region building and the construction of identity in the BSR. Based on a 
literature review, it was concluded that processes of region building and identity 
formation in the BSR are closely interwoven. The identity of the region and the 
region itself are continually constructed in discourses through a demarcation of the 
self against the other. Therefore, the policy-makers who construct the identity of the 
BSR by means of their discursive practices also construct the region as a whole.  
Secondly, a possibly existing identity of the BSR has been examined closer with 
regard to literature and an empirical study. The identity of the BSR has been defined 
as the sum of characteristics that determine its individuality. In the literature, it is 
claimed that the most outstanding characteristics of the BSR are its post-modern 
qualities, symbolised by the metaphor of Olympic rings Europe, its inclusiveness 
and its overlapping networks. Other characteristics – or bases for identification – 
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have been found in the empirical study: the Viking Age as a common history, 
Europeanness and economic success.  
By means of the empirical study, it has not been possible to determine which of the 
characteristics, if any, have been the most important for constituting a Baltic 
identity. Nevertheless, it has been stated that each of the characteristics emphasised 
in the empirical study could have negative implications on the relations between 
Russia and the other BSR countries if a Baltic identity was promoted carelessly. 
Firstly, the aspect “Viking Age” as a common history for the whole BSR could 
touch upon a highly disputed issue about Slavic and thereby Eastern versus 
Scandinavian and thus Western influences in the history of Russia. Secondly, the 
characteristic “Europeanness” should be handled with care. The policy-makers 
should avoid associating the word “European” with “Western”. Finally, welfare and 
economic success as components of a Baltic identity are most likely to widen the 
gap between Russia and its EU neighbours. It is questionable whether the Russian 
regions can feel part of Europe’s most successful region as long as the new EU 
border prevents them from benefiting from the economic success in the same way as 
their Baltic neighbours do. Only if the Russian regions reached the same level of 
prosperity as the other parts of the BSR, could this divide be closed. As to whether 
cooperation in the BSR will solve the tensions between the EU and Russia or 
whether the BSR will continue to be of political importance at all is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
It is the people of the Baltic Sea region who have to adopt those characteristics in 
order for a Baltic identity to come into being. Whether this is already the case, only 
large-scale empirical research can show. Thus it remains to be examined whether 
inhabitants of, for example, Zealand in Denmark, Pomerania in Poland and the St. 
Petersburg district of Northwest Russia feel a notion of commonness because they 
share the same history, because they all are Europeans and because they all believe 
in the economic success of “their” region, or because of completely different 
characteristics they attribute to the BSR – if a notion of that region exists in their 
minds at all. 
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